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HUMANIZING THE FINANCIAL 
ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBALIZATION: A 
TRIBUTE TO THE WORK OF CYNTHIA 
liCHTENSTEIN 
FRANK j. GARCIA* 
Abstract: This Tribute reviews the many contributions by Cynthia 
Lichtenstein to the literature on international financial markets. When 
viewed as a whole, Professor Lichtenstein's work suggests that the 
globalization of the monetary system offers new opportunities for 
increased human welfare, but only if state and international regulators 
combine technical expertise with a genuine understanding of the 
human effects of global markets, much as Professor Lichtenstein does 
in her own work. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Symposium is a celebration of the rich tradition of interna-
tional law at Boston College-rich for having had Owen Kupfer-
schmid as a student, rich for the Holocaust and Human Rights project 
which he created and inspires to this day, and rich for the many con-
tributions of our honored colleague, Cynthia Lichtenstein, during the 
thirty years in which she has called Boston College Law School her 
professional home. Many have noted Professor Lichtenstein's pio-
neering role as a woman in international law, making numerous 
significant contributions and reaching the highest levels of achieve-
ment in the profession, both in the United States and abroad. I would 
like to focus my reflections on her work as a scholar, in particular with 
reference to the central problem of our era: globalization and its ef-
fects on individual and communal social welfare-and particularly its 
effects on state sovereignty. 
My students are surprised when I remind them that sovereignty 
can be understood at least historically as a progressive human rights 
concept: to strengthen the autonomy of states was to clarifY their in-
* Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. The author would like to thank 
Friedemann Thomma and Soohyun Jun for their exceptional research assistance in the 
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dependence from imperial and pontifical ambitions. It was, in this 
way, a subsidiarity principle, bringing the locus of control closer to the 
fundamental moral unit-the individual. Of course, state sovereignty 
is only part of the contemporary doctrinal equipment for protecting 
human rights, and it has unfortunately become more frequently asso-
ciated with abuses of human rights-sovereignty as a cover for wrong-
doing instead of as a shield against wrongful intervention. Our chal-
lenge is to preserve those vital and progressive aspects of sovereignty 
in a new, global environment, while reconfiguring its unnecessary, 
outmoded, or inimical aspects. 
It is therefore fitting that our Symposium begins with the subject 
of international human rights and continues with the topic of global-
ization and the erosion of sovereignty. This juncture between the two 
Symposium sessions is noteworthy because the tension between the 
progressive and regressive aspects of state sovereignty is central both 
to the Kupferschmid Project and to the work of Cynthia Lichtenstein.1 
I. HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL MARKETS 
Historically we are at a critical juncture in the relationship be-
tween human rights and markets, between globalization and margi-
nalization. In his recent book, jihad v. McWorld,2 Benjamin Barber re-
minds us that modern liberal democratic society is caught in the clash 
of two opposing forces: on the one hand, disintegrative tribalism and 
reactionary fundamentalism, and on the other hand, integrative 
modernization and aggressive economic and cultural globalization. 
According to Barber, the key to successfully navigating this challenge 
lies in developing truly democratic global institutions, capable of the 
humane exercise of economic and political power. It is at this junc-
ture between economic power and human welfare that we can locate 
Professor Lichtenstein's work and draw lessons therefrom. 
1 Interestingly enough, it was Professor Lichtenstein herself who noted that interna-
tional human rights and international economic policy were both very important to Owen 
Kupferschmid, when she opened the sixth Boston College Holocaust and Human Rights 
conference in 1992, honoring his memory. See generally Cynthia Lichtenstein et al., Tribute 
to Owen Kupferschmid and Opening Address (Holocaust and Human Rights Law: The Sixth Inter-
national Conference), 12 B.C. THIRD WoRLD LJ. 191 (1992). It is also very appropriate to 
recognize and honor Professor Lichtenstein's own accomplishments in this context. 
2 BENJAMIN R BARBER, JIHAD v. Me WoRLD: How GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE RE-
SHAPING THE WORLD 1 (1996). 
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A. Regulating Financial Markets 
A central preoccupation in Professor Lichtenstein's work has 
been the responsible oversight of concentrated financial and eco-
nomic power by state and multinational regulatory bodies. She has 
spent decades studying and shaping the complex relationship be-
tween, on the one hand, capital-rich states, private capital actors, and 
the Bretton Woods Institutions, and on the other hand, the individual 
human needs and rights of the millions affected by decisions taken at 
all levels in the international monetary system, especially those af-
fected in developing countries. 
Key to this relationship in the globalization era is understanding 
the variety of levels at which effective control over monetary policy 
can be exercised: regulation of private actors in their foreign capital 
transactions (foreign direct investment and portfolio equity invest-
ment); state banking regulation by quasi-public regulatory and pro-
fessional bodies; and regulation by the international Bretton Woods 
institutions. The globalizing economy requires and enhances the ex-
change of international capital, as was recognized early on by the 
European Community (EC) in making the free movement of capital 
one of the four freedoms vital to the creation of the "single" market. 
Since the essential mobility of investment capital often defies effective 
national regulation, globalization requires increasingly comprehen-
sive and powerful global monetary regulation, one reason for the ero-
sion of state sovereignty. These developments have brought to the 
fore the role of the Bretton Woods institutions in forming global eco-
nomic policy, and thereby enhancing, securing, or degrading global 
social welfare. 
Professor Lichtenstein's work accepts the basic premise of eco-
nomic modernity-that a liberal trading system is a positive force for 
increased global welfare. However, she adds an important caveat to 
this: the economic benefits of modernity will not flow to the develop-
ing world unless the financial institutions of modernity, in particular 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) and World Bank, 
pay adequate attention to these countries' concerns in setting interna-
tional monetary policy. The centrality of monetary policy to the reali-
zation of modernity's economic promise illustrates a fundamental 
tension in liberal western capitalism: money is a necessary, if not 
sufficient, element in most forms of human welfare, but concentra-
tions of money, and the way such concentrations are managed, can 
become powerful, inimical forces degrading individual human wel-
fare. Moreover, while powerful financial institutions are often blamed 
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for a variety of domestic ills and abuses, the failure of powerful 
financial institutions can have calamitous effects on individuals, states, 
and the international economy, as seen in the 1994 Mexican peso cri-
sis, in which a sudden withdrawal of much of the international portfo-
lio investment disastrously weakened the peso's exchange rate.3 
Professor Lichtenstein's work has always been concerned with 
both the vigor of domestic and international banking, and the 
soundness of the domestic and international financial regulatory sys-
tem. For example, in her critiques of the FDIC Improvement Act of 
1991,4 or the 1991 overhaul of the Federal Reserve Bank's interna-
tional banking regulation, Regulation K, 5 she endeavors to balance a 
concern for the prudential aspects of banking regulation with a con-
cern to preserve the competitiveness of U.S. banking industry, and 
competition within that industry. Fewer restraints on competition 
among financial services providers contributes to more competitive 
U.S. capital markets for both the United States and foreign banking 
organizations. 
Moreover, Professor Lichtenstein has sought to emphasize that 
domestic regulation should not proceed without an informed under-
standing of its international implications.6 Domestic regulators can 
create dangerous loopholes when they attempt to regulate the over-
seas banking efforts of their domestic banks without adequately re-
solving the coordination problems states face in multilateral regula-
tion. An example is Professor Lichtenstein's criticism of the Federal 
Reserve Bank's 1982 regulations on U.S. banks' reserve and examina-
tion requirements, which operated to the detriment of U.S. banks in-
terested in Euro currency markets.7 By paying close attention to po-
tential costs to be borne by U.S. banks participating in markets 
overseas and the level of competitiveness of these banks, she sought to 
provide both the background and explain the need for the amend-
ments for these regulations.s 
3 See generaUy Cynthia Lichtenstein, The Mexican Crisis: ltno Should be a Country's Lender 
ofLastResort?, 18FORDHAMINT'LLJ.1769 (1995). 
4 Cynthia Lichtenstein, U.S. Restructuring Legislation: Revising the International Banking 
Act of 1978, For the Worse?, 60 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 507, 537 (1992). 
5 See generally Cynthia Lichtenstein, Thinking the Unthinkabl£: ltnat Should Commercial 
Banks or Their Holding Companies Be Allowed to Oum?, 67 IND. LJ. 251 (1992). 
6 Cynthia Lichtenstein, The U.S. Response to the International Debt Crisis: The International 
Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 25 VA.J. INT'L L. 401, 417-18 (1985). 
7 Cynthia Lichtenstein, United States: Federal Reserve System Rules Concerning International 
Banking Facilities, 21 I.L.M. 872, 872-77 (1982). 
8Jd. 
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Thus, with respect to these and other issues, Professor Lichten-
stein has repeatedly pointed out the difficulties faced by authorities in 
regulating their banks' foreign operations without impeding competi-
tiveness in world markets, and emphasized the critical need for coop-
erative efforts in international banking regulation.9 However, Profes-
sor Lichtenstein's concern for sound financial regulation has never 
been merely a concern for the protection of capital through law. 
Rather, it has always extended to a concern that those with money, 
and those charged with regulating money, manage this tremendous 
power with an understanding of what is at stake for everyone else. Ir-
responsible involvement by U.S. banks in foreign lending creates vul-
nerability for all parties concerned-the individuals in developing 
countries whose economic futures are blighted by high levels of pub-
lic debt, the U.S. banks themselves, and potentially the customers of 
the U.S. banks at home in the United States. 
B. Managing International Monetary Crises 
Professor Lichtenstein has also been an astute critic of U.S. ap-
proaches to international debt crises and international monetary pol-
icy with respect to emerging markets and developing economies.10 
She has criticized the U.S.' past ad-hoc management approach of 
temporarily extending more lending to developing countries facing 
debt crises, and stressed the importance of enabling those countries 
to return to creditworthiness by reducing the total amount of debt, 
encouraging new investment flows, and promoting the return of 
flight capital.ll Much of this concern has been focused on the many 
attempts by capital-rich countries to use or misuse the IMF for essen-
tially political reasons-attempts which Professor Lichtenstein has 
roundly criticized. 
For example, the close relationship between a country's money 
supply and its capacity to do business and project power abroad 
makes international investment or the re-payment of international 
loans an attractive point at which to attempt to control other govern-
9 See, e.g., Cynthia Lichtenstein et al., Cooperative Efforts in International Banking Regula-
tion, 76AM. Soc'y lNT'L PRoc. 352,353 (1982). 
IO Cynthia Lichtenstein et al., International Debt: How Can Developing Countries Regain 
Creditworthiness? 83 AM. Soc'v lNT'L PRoc. 87,89 (1989). 
11 !d. 
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ments by indirectly blocking their access to financial reserves.12 Such 
efforts, if undertaken without IMF approval, are violations of interna-
tional legal obligations; so states have through political channels 
sought the IMF's blessing for such sanctions. Professor Lichtenstein 
quite properly and vigorously asks why the IMF should be in this 
game.I3 The IMF was never meant to serve as a sanctioning agent or 
to have its authority over exchange controls used to legitimize politi-
cal sanctions, but rather is concerned with furthering the health of 
the international trading markets for goods and services. Neverthe-
less, the IMF's power to affect the exchange position of participating 
countries makes it an attractive target for political lobbying, to the 
detriment of all parties concerned. 
Another example is the controversial decision on the part of the 
G-7 countries in 1993 to funnel Russian aid through the IMF. In mar-
shaling her critiques based on the history, culture, and legal structure 
of the IMF14, we see Professor Lichtenstein in the role of both lawyer 
and legal scholar, offering us the reality check of institutional limita-
tions on client ambitions, and concerned that states not weaken im-
portant systems by choosing them for the wrong tasks. Such misuse of 
an international institution by powerful nations exposes the IMF to 
criticism from all sides for failures which could easily have been fore-
seen, given the nature of the IMF's intended role and its institutional 
culture. Instead, she emphasizes the Fund's role in aiding indebted 
countries to grow out of their debt burden by encouraging structural 
adjustments and furthering growth and transformation of econo-
mies.I5 One can also hear in this criticism her disappointment on aes-
thetic as well as professional grounds-it is a sloppy way to make 
globallaw.I6 
C. Monetary Globalization 
Returning to themes of globalization and sovereignty, Professor 
Lichtenstein was one of the first to understand how monetary global-
ization would reshape the architecture of power among states and in-
12 Cynthia Lichtenstein, The Battle for International Bank Accounts: Restrictions on Interna-
tional Payments for Political Ends and Article VIII of the Fund Agreement, 19 N.YU.J. INT'L L. & 
PoL. 981,981-91 (1987). 
15 !d. 
14 Cynthia Lichtenstein, Aiding the Transformation of Economies: Is the Funds Conditionality 
Appropriate to the Task?, 62 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1943, 1944 (1994). 
u Id. 
16 Jd. 
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ternational organizations.J7 Since money is power, and money must be 
regulated transnationally in a global economy, state power itself is be-
ing regulated at the multilateral level by the institutions that manage 
those capital flows, in particular the IMF. Professor Lichtenstein has 
never ceased to review and critique efforts by international institu-
tions to manage systemic risks and consequences flowing from capital 
movement.I8 Recognition of the evils of capital controls necessitates a 
degree of international oversight over capital flows. The international 
community can insist upon the adoption of financial reforms in debt-
ridden countries, and the Fund will impose internationally agreed-
upon reforms as a condition of extending credit. This necessarily im-
plies an erosion of the sovereignty of nation-states. 
But Professor Lichtenstein's work also recognizes that the erosion 
of sovereignty is not by itself a problem-it can be a positive develop-
ment for global social welfare, if capital is effectively and fairly man-
aged for the benefit of all concerned by the institutions of globaliza-
tion.19 The real problem is not multilateralism per se, but situations in 
which the political element of international financial regulation al-
lows the interests of powerful capital-owning classes, multinational 
corporations, and capital-rich countries to overpower the interests of 
the rest of the world in the structure of international financial policy. 
If the interposition of a layer of international governance between 
states and their money is to have any legitimacy, it must result in an 
increase in prudent decision-making in the best interests of the system 
and of the people it serves, particularly those in capital-poor coun-
tries. 
D. Reforming the System 
Concern over the integrity of the international financial regula-
tory system is a key refrain in Professor Lichtenstein's work-given a 
range of responses to international monetary crises, which is best 
from the perspective of the system's capabilities and traditions? For 
17 See generally Cynthia Lichtenstein, International Standards for Consolidated Supervision of 
Financial Conglomerates: Controlling Systemic Risk, 19 BROOK. ]. INT'L L. 13 7 ( 1993); Cynthia 
Lichtenstein, Dealing with Sovereign Liquidity Crises: New International Initiatives for the New 
World of Volatile Capital Flows To and From Emerging Markets, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 807 
( 1998) [hereinafter Dealing with Sovereign Liquidity Crises]. 
18 See Cynthia Lichtenstein, Introduction to the Panel on ''Preventing Asian Type Crises: Who, 
If Anyone, Should Have jurisdiction Over Capital Movements?, 5 ILSAJ INT'L & COMP. L. 395, 
396 (1999). 
19 Dealing with Sovereign Liquidity Crises, supra note 17, at 812. 
210 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:203 
example, Professor Lichtenstein chronicles the extent to which the 
role of modern capital markets in developing economies has put ex-
change controls on capital transfers (not current accounts transfers) 
outside the range of tools available to developing countries to manage 
their money supply. This has put development and welfare at the 
mercy of foreign capital, especially portfolio-based capital. How can 
the balance be restored? 
One part of the answer, in her words: "financial sector reform 
and the creation of a domestic banking system that adheres to ade-
quate (and internationally agreed-upon) prudential standards and is 
regulated and supervised by an independent technically adequate su-
pervisory system."20 Thus, we have come full circle, from the local to 
the global and back to the local again. Effective domestic banking 
regulation is part of the prescription for a well-managed, pro-
development global financial system. 
Another part of the answer arises in one of my favorite pieces by 
Professor Lichtenstein, an essay in memory of Bill Bishop. In this es-
say, she asks the question: "Does international human rights law have 
something to teach monetary law?"21 A wonderful question, very 
much suggesting the way in which Professor Lichtenstein's work fits 
into the questions raised by this Symposium. In this essay she defends 
the validity of current-account exchange control regimes by develop-
ing countries, based on the essential relationship between capital and 
development.22 She notes that the creation of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem has eroded the sovereignty of states to impose exchange control 
regimes at will.23 At the same time, the system also strengthens sover-
eignty, in that it requires other states to recognize Fund-approved ex-
change control regimes as grounds for not enforcing otherwise valid 
exchange contracts in their domestic courts. The particular problem 
Professor Lichtenstein writes about in that piece concerns the 
difficulty of preventing circumvention of these exchange controls by 
private parties, through this contract-voiding mechanism alone, and 
she makes the innovative suggestion that states could avail themselves 
of the alien tort statute by framing their suits in U.S. courts as claims 
in international tort against circumventing parties.24 
20 !d. 
21 See generally Cynthia Lichtenstein, Does International Human Rights Law Have Something 
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There are several interesting points presented by this essay. First, 
it helps us understand, through the lens of exchange controls, the 
complex architecture of globalization and its effects on state sover-
eignty. Second, it is innovative-there is no mention of the idea of 
using the alien tort statute in this context before Professor Lichten-
stein's piece, and after one reads her exposition of this, one says, "of 
course, why didn't I think of that?" Third, it takes a very lawyerly ap-
proach to issues of great political and moral importance. Professor 
Lichtenstein is writing, essentially, about development, about the rela-
tionship between capital and development, and about the responsibil-
ity which states have, in the positive use of sovereignty, to enact mone-
tary policy protecting and promoting the human rights of their 
citizens. 25 
But she does not remain in the comfortable world of generali-
ties-! think she would consider that a failure of her responsibility as 
a lawyer, as one who is given the keys to the system. Rather, she is 
quite specific and practical-states face the problem of making their 
legitimate exchange control systems work in the face of private cir-
cumvention-what can the legal system do about this? Here is one 
possibility: take a successful human rights remedy in U.S. courts, the 
Alien Tort Statute, and re-imagine it as a vehicle against the circum-
vention of exchange controls. Let's figure out what the system can do. 
CONCLUSION 
When speaking at a conference on globalization, Judge Christo-
pher Weeramantry made the striking observation that during the late 
Middle Ages when stock markets were first being formed, capitalists 
consulted with theologians as to the moral requirements attendant to 
forming such exchanges. In today's world, legal academics are the 
new theologians, globalization the new exchange. In the endeavor to 
match sophisticated morally informed legal advice to the regulatory 
developments of her time, Professor Lichtenstein stands out. There 
has not been a single major event in the field of global banking and 
financial regulation that Professor Lichtenstein has not studied, 
thought about, written about, and sought to reform, ranging from the 
seizure of Iranian assets in the early 1980's,26 through the growth of 
European financial markets, the various Mexican financial crises, and 
25 See generally id. 
26 See generally Cynthia Lichtenstein & Edward Gordon, The Decision to Block Iranian As-
sets-Reexamined, 16 INT'Ll.Aw 161 (1982). 
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important changes in U.S. financial regulation over the last thirty 
years, to the Latin debt crisis of the 1990s, and the Asian crises of the 
past decade. 
Professor Lichtenstein's many responses to these issues as a 
scholar bear the hallmarks of Cynthia herself-insightful, pragmatic, 
and to the point. Her work embodies the defining characteristics of a 
gifted academic lawyer. It is not simply the presence of moral con-
cern-we all can and must share that-but the marriage of moral con-
cern with a sophisticated and deeply pragmatic understanding of the 
regulatory system, and a passion to make that system work for the 
benefit of those at risk, that I find most challenging about her work. 
